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ABSTRACT 
Among the many weapons currently used by terrorist 
organizations against public welfare and coalition forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, human-born Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) present a significant threat. Commonly 
referred to as “suicide bombers,” these individuals enter 
crowded public areas in order to detonate the IED, 
inflicting lethal damage to the surrounding individuals. 
Constructed of non-standard parts and hidden under layers 
of clothing, these human-born IEDs go undetected until 
detonated. Currently, there are no detection systems that 
can identify suicide bombers at adequate standoff 
distances.  
The purpose of this research is to develop a 
methodology that combines current technologies to increase 
the probability of identifying a suicide bomber at a 
checkpoint or marketplace with an adequate standoff 
distance. The proposed methodology will employ each sensor 
technology incorporating unique detection threshold values. 
We will analyze our proposed methodology utilizing a 
simulation model that provides both the probability of 
detecting a bomber and the probability of a false 
detection. These simulations will allow us to determine the 
threshold values for each sensor that result in the best 
probability of detection of a suicide bomber and allows for 
a small probability of false detections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND ON SUICIDE BOMBERS 
Over the last twenty-five years, suicide attacks 
have emerged as one of the most effective methods 
used on a large scale by terrorist organizations. 
   – L. Wells III and B.M. Horowitz 
 
An individual who is willing to sacrifice his own life 
by causing a detonation in an attack is a significant force 
multiplier when employed against a conventional security 
force (Wells III & Horowitz, 2005).  The purpose of a 
suicide attack is to create fear, mayhem, and chaos within 
a region.  The doctrine of asymmetric warfare views suicide 
attacks as a result of an imbalance of power in which 
groups with little power resort to suicide bombing as a 
convenient tactic to demoralize the targeted civilians or 
government of their enemies. As of 2005, suicide attacks 
have been used in only seven of the sixty-nine countries 
that have had violent uprisings in the last half century, 
but the effects of suicide attacks are much more lethal 
than most armed attacks (Berman & Laitin, 2005). 
B. DEFINITION OF A SUICIDE BOMBER 
Suicide bombings can be defined as violent, 
politically motivated attacks, carried out in a deliberate 
state of awareness by a person who blows himself up 
together with a chosen target (Bloom, 2004).  A successful 
suicide attack is accomplished with the preconceived notion 
that the attacker will have certain death.  
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Suicide bombing as a practice encompasses attacks 
of military targets that are immune via ordinary 
insurgent tactics, the assassination of prominent 
leaders (who would ordinarily not be accessible 
by other means), and the attack of large numbers 
of civilians, mimicking indiscrimination to 
create generalized fear. (Bloom, 2004) 
Suicide attackers can be classified into two 
categories, state or non-state.  The majority of the groups 
that commit suicide attacks are insurgent or terrorist 
groups that are competing for control with an established 
state (Bloom, 2004). 
Most terrorist groups using suicide attacks are 
usually in conflict with an established state. Suicide 
attacks are used when opposing sides have disputes or 
differences regarding racial, ethnic, religious, or 
national sovereignty issues. It is the preconceived plan of 
the terrorists groups that their suicide bombings will 
frighten and overwhelm the opposing force or organization, 
while also raising awareness of the dedication and resolve 
of their cause (Dickson, 2008).  
Financially, suicide attacks are relatively 
inexpensive. The price of the materials used in a suicide 
attack in Israel can be obtained for about $150 (Cronin, 
2003). This allows terrorist groups to easily purchase and 
produce suicide bombs without drawing the attention of 
authorities or government organizations.  Economically, the 
price to produce a suicide bomb and to have an individual 
successfully carry out an attack is a small price to pay 
when compared to the casualties and destruction resulting 
from the attack (Dickson, 2008).  On the other hand, 
finding members in the terrorist group and training them to 
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carry suicide attacks and give their lives to its cause is 
a costly venture.  This means terrorist groups conduct 
suicide attacks only when necessary (Berman & Laitin, 
2005). 
C. SUICIDE BOMBING TARGETS 
Depending on the target of a suicide bombing, public 
protest or objection will vary.  Terrorists not only target 
civilians, but they also target military personnel, 
military bases or installations, international 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations.   
The public response to the tactical use of 
suicide bombing depends on how the tactic is used 
by the insurgent organizations, against whom, and 
for what purpose.  If suicide terror does not 
resonate and the domestic environment is 
antagonistic to it, it will be rejected by the 
rank and file. Violence will fail it win over the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the public, the insurgent 
groups’ goal. (Bloom, 2004) 
It makes sense for suicide attackers to choose targets 
that will have the largest impact to the conflict’s 
opposing side. Since military installations are usually 
heavily guarded or hardened, many times the easiest targets 
are civilian installations or soft targets (Dickson, 2008). 
For the use of anti-personnel suicide bombings, attack 
planners have adapted and learned many new techniques. 
Where facilities cannot be penetrated, jihadists have 
become adept at identifying places where crowds gather.  
When the supporting population detests attacks on 




to attacking military or hard targets while accepting the 
increased risk of mission failure by trying to attack the 
more fortified targets.   
Places where large crowds congregate are prime targets 
of opportunity for suicide bomber attacks.  Past suicide 
bombings have taken place at airports, military bases, 
public buildings, market centers, subways, schools, banks, 
and malls (Toet, 2003).  These are all places that include 
infrastructure that is important for carrying out the 
routine functions of a society.  Most target areas can be 
categorized into two main scenarios: a marketplace or 
crowded public area, and an entry control point or 
checkpoint (Dickson, 2008).  
The typical marketplace is an open area that is filled 
with many people moving in different directions with many 
entrances and exits for people to transit.  This scenario 
has a high probability for having large numbers of 
casualties and injuries due to the large number of people.  
The second scenario is an entry control point or 
checkpoint. This scenario is commonly used by military and 
security personnel while screening individuals as they pass 
through an unsecure area to a secure area. Many times, 
there are current technologies installed at these 
checkpoints to reveal concealed weapons. Each of these 
scenarios allow for the use of differing technologies for 
weapons detection. Some detection technologies are more 
applicable in certain situations and areas. For instance, 
the entry control point or checkpoint may allow the use of 
technologies that work at short distances and screen 
individuals one at a time. While in a typical marketplace 
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scenario, a detection system would have to scan large areas 
and accurately pinpoint the suicide bomber at greater 
distances (Dickson, 2008). 
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUICIDE BOMBERS 
In order to better recognize suicide bombers, it will 
help to understand the demographics of suicide bombers and 
the organizations to which they belong.  Terrorist 
organizations are diverse and adaptable. For example, Al 
Qaeda has members from multiple countries, each with 
varying cultures.  A suicide bomber has no single 
identifying feature or characteristic that makes him or her 
stand out from the surroundings. This makes identifying or 
profiling potential suspects very difficult.  The typical 
traits of a suicide bomber have changed from the past.  The 
connection between economic and social status has 
diminished among the people that carry out suicide 
bombings.  In the past, most suicide bombers were under-
privileged, lower-class youths with little education and 
social status.  These trends are becoming less noticeable 
as the profile of a typical suicide bomber has evolved.  
Also in the past, males mostly carried out suicide attacks, 
but recently, since the Iraqi insurgency, more females have 
been used to carry out suicide bombings. From a report 
written by the Israeli Security Service (Shin Bet), it was 
noted that in the past, terrorist organizations are trying 
harder to exploit “weak” members of the population such as 
children, women, the sick and those who suffer from social 




This is the supposition that women and children are seen as 
tender, delicate and innocent, and as such stimulates less 
suspicion than men (Dickson, 2008). 
Another adaptation of the terrorist groups, besides 
expanding their potential sources of people to carry out 
the suicide bombings to women and weak members of the 
population, is to recruit members from higher social 
classes.  An increasing number of suicide bombers are 
people who have an educated background, are employed, and 
maintain an average lifestyle for the society they are 
living in.  Terrorist groups are able to recruit members of 
this stature because of the increased knowledge and 
understanding they have of the ideological message of the 
terrorist organization (Berman & Laitin, 2005). The Israeli 
Security Service reported that since 2000, suicide bombers 
are predominately single men; however, they are relatively 
educated and aged between 17 and 24. The Israeli Security 
Service found that about 21% of suicide bombers had an 
elementary or college education (Zedalis, 2004). 
Religious groups are not the only organizations using 
suicide bombings for terror.  There are many groups secular 
in nature that engage in terrorist acts.  The differences 
between the insurgents or terrorists and the state may be a 
combination of ethnicity, language, and religion (Dickson, 
2008). When hyper-segregation is present inside a society, 
ideas of otherness are easier to promote by insurgents, and 
it becomes easier for a people to dehumanize people on the 
other side and recognize them as legitimate targets for 
suicide attacks (Bloom, 2004). 
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Suicide attackers can be categorized into two types of 
people. The first type are people who have been raised from 
within the terrorist organization.  This type of person 
believes in the greater good for which the organization 
stands for and is willing to sacrifice his own life to 
support the greater cause.  The second type are people 
brought from the outside of the terrorist organization to 
the inside.  They are educated from other sources besides 
the terrorist organization but are drawn into the 
organization for personal reasons.  Others are drawn into 
suicide attacks for the awards they or their families are 
promised to receive.  Awards can be monetary or spiritual 
in nature.  An example of this would be the satisfaction 
that honor has been restored to a family through acts of 
vengeance from the suicide attack (Bloom, 2004).  
E. COUNTERING SUICIDE BOMBERS 
Countering the suicide bomber threat is categorized 
into four areas: prevention, detection, neutralization, and 
response (Dickson, 2008). 
1. Prevention 
It is the primary goal to stop all attacks in the 
first step; however, this is an extremely difficult 
process.  Prevention is extremely reliant on accurate and 
timely intelligence.   Various intelligence agencies are 
constantly gathering and assembling information regarding 
terrorist organizations in the attempt to thwart suicide 
bombings.  It is not uncommon for suicide attacks to be 
routinely stopped before they are initiated.  In June 2003, 
the Israel Defense Force was able to prevent twenty-five 
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suicide attacks (Dudkevitch, 2003).  Many of these 
potential attacks were discovered at checkpoints, by 
security guards, and by aerial surveillance technologies.  
This is important because this illustrates proof that 
suicide bombers can be identified using various tactics or 
identification methods.  
Another prevention technique is to deny or decrease 
the ability of attackers to obtain the required materials 
for the weapons.  This is also a daunting task because many 
of the weapons and explosives can easily be purchased on 
black markets, or they can be made with everyday household 
items.  In the United States, for example, between 1993 and 
1997, over 10 tons of explosives were stolen (Nunn, 2004). 
2. Detection 
Preventing an individual from carrying out his 
intended actions is extremely difficult.  When potential 
suicide bombers are identified through accurate 
intelligence, there is usually little time and 
communication to determine their actions and intentions.  
When law enforcement agencies are not able to prevent a 
suicide bomber from carrying out an attack, the next 
process is to detect the suicide bomber while he is en 
route to his target.   What makes the process of detection 
difficult is that the suicide bomber has the flexibility to 
change course or change targets while on the move. 
3. Neutralization 
The desired end state the security forces want to 
achieve will affect the type of detection method required.  
If the goal is to neutralize or kill the suicide bomber 
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before he can initiate his attack, then the method used for 
detection must not produce any false alarms.  This will 
prevent innocent and unarmed people from unnecessarily 
getting hurt.  If the goal is to pull aside potential 
suspects and conduct further searches, then a less certain 
or accurate method may be used. In addition to determining 
who the suicide bomber is, security forces must also 
determine the type and size of the explosive threat. This 
information is important in preparing emergency personnel 
so they can set up outside the lethal blast and 
fragmentation range of the explosives. 
4. Response 
Dealing with an identified suicide bomber is the 
fourth major area of interdiction.  The primary goal should 
always be to interdict and divert the suicide bomber from a 
crowded area to limit the number of casualties.  The ideal 
situation would be to disable the suicide bomber and disarm 
the explosive device with no injuries.   
The United States Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Agency 
has established guidelines dealing with suicide bombers.  
Since a suicide bomber has already chosen to end his life, 
it is very difficult to persuade the suicide bomber to stop 
his intended actions. The “close and negotiate” tactics 
will not work. This makes it extremely difficult to disarm 
the threat.  While there are many attempts at thwarting 
these attacks by addressing the root-cause issues for the 
destructive behavior of suicide bombers, the continuing 
focus must try to stop any attack that may be in the 
planning phase or in progress.  The use of current and 
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emerging technologies will be a crucial element to identify 
and prevent suicide attacks (Dickson, 2008). 
F. UNITED STATES SECURITY CONCERNS 
The use of suicide bombers as a terrorist tactic poses 
a significant question to security forces. How do you stop 
a suicide bomber on his way to the target?  
Individuals who carry improvised explosives on their 
bodies and detonate those explosives in public places are a 
significant security problem that the United States 
Department of Defense and its allies face when operating in 
certain regions of the world and when conducting operations 
against jihadist organizations.  Past examples of this 
problem are most evident in the Israeli and Palestinian 
conflict.  The government of Israel and the Israeli Defense 
Force has yet to solve the advanced detection of 
Palestinian suicide bombers as they pass through 
checkpoints (Greneker et al., 2005).  Since 2001, suicide 
bombers have murdered over 500 Israeli civilians (Kaplan & 
Kress, 2005). 
Between 2000 and 2002, only 1% of attacks in Israel 
were attributed to suicide attacks, but 44% of the Israeli 
casualties were a result of these attacks (Nunn, 
2004). Since the United States started its campaign on the 
global war on terror in 2001, suicide bombers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have killed hundreds of civilians and military 
troops (Kaplan & Kress, 2005). 
1. Recent Suicide Bombings 
On February 1, 2010, a female suicide bomber walking 
among Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad detonated an explosive 
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belt, killing 54 people and wounding more than 122. The 
suicide bomber hid the explosives underneath her abaya (a 
black dress worn head to toe by women) as she joined a 
group of pilgrims on the outskirts of Baghdad’s Shiite-
dominated neighborhood of Shaab. The bomber set off the 
explosives as she lined up with other women to be searched 
by female security guards at a security checkpoint just 
inside a rest tent (Associated Press, 2010).    
In Afghanistan, on December 30, 2009, a suicide bomber 
infiltrated a CIA base, killing seven Americans and 
seriously wounded six others.  The bomber was Humam Khalil 
Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor, who was working as 
a triple agent for Al-Qaeda.  The CIA had invited al-Balawi 
to its base in Khost, eastern Afghanistan, believing he was 
about to divulge the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden’s 
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Al-Balawi was able to enter the 
base through the checkpoint without being screened. 
Concealed beneath his clothes was an explosive device 
detonated once inside.    
In the first example, detection equipment was used but 
not applied, allowing for any standoff detection.  The 
female suicide bomber was able to gain access into the 
target area.  Security personnel scanning people using 
handheld scanners provided no early warning or detection 
indicators. If the female suicide bomber was detected, it 
would have been too late.  She was already inside her 
target area surrounded by a large group of people.  In the 
second example, the CIA bombing shows that a suicide bomber 
can strike at any time and that one can never know who 
suicide bombers are, even though the bomber passed through 
a security checkpoint.  
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The chance of suicide bomber attacks in the Iraqi and 
Afghan theater of operations continues to stay high.  Most 
of the checkpoints and base entry points are not equipped 
with the appropriate equipment to screen for potential 
suicide bombers (Alexander et al., 2009).  Neither the 
Iraqi nor Afghan governments have the technology or 
equipment to set up surveillance and screening areas for 
their respective marketplaces or public areas. 
The Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
on Terrorists and Suicide Attacks in August 2003 stated:  
Suicide attacks by terrorist organizations have 
become more prevalent globally and assessing the 
threat of future suicide attacks against the US 
has gained strategic importance.  While suicide 
attacks have been employed internationally for 
centuries, the degree at which this tactic could 
be used to carry out operations against Americans 
was more widely appreciated since 9/11.  The 
vulnerability of the US homeland to suicide 
attacks was amply demonstrated, virtually all 
previous such attacks by foreign actors against 
US citizens had happened on foreign soil. 
(Cronin, 2003) 
The hidden and indiscriminate nature of suicide 
bombers and the difficulty to detect them make it that much 
more of an issue for security forces.   
2. U.S. Government Actions 
In 2004, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) convened a panel of experts through the National 
Research Council to study methods to detect suicide bombers 
from a standoff distance. The National Research Council’s 
comprehensive report detailing how sensors operating in the 
X-ray, Infrared, Millimeter Wave, and Terahertz, in 
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principle, can detect a suicide bomber wearing explosives 
from standoff distances of at least 10 meters. A 
significant issue with this is that 10 meters is not an 
adequate standoff distance to protect security personnel 
from an explosive’s blast over pressure and fragmentation, 
and the existing technologies are not affordable and 
reliable for widespread deployment (Kaplan & Kress, 2005). 
One of the main problems and concerns in detecting 
suicide bombers with sensor technology is that the 
detection needs to occur at operational and tactically 
relevant ranges. For military utility in detection of 
suicide bombers, significant standoff is required in order 
to reduce exposure to prematurely detonated devices and 
prevent destruction of equipment.  Another challenge and 
issue is deciphering the clutter and false alarms or false 
positives from the sensor equipment.  Creating automatic 
differentiation of potential items of interest from a wide 
range of items carried on a body can save precious time 
when security decisions need to be made.  There also must 
be some method for data and sensor fusion.  To maximize 
detection, there must be combination, alignment, and 
analysis of data from multiple sensors in real-time.  A 
last challenge in detecting a suicide bomber is to conduct 
crowd surveillance searches, pinpointing the sensors on a 
moving individual within a larger crowd. 
The overarching goal in developing a detection 
methodology is to detect a weak signal or a small 




noisy and dynamic background, and then present the signals 
in real-time to security personnel, so they can make a 
security decision in a timely manner. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF JIEDDO 
In October 2003, the Army Chief of Staff established 
the Army IED Task Force in an effort to counter the 
escalating use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This task force reached out to all 
DoD components, the private sector and academia to improve 
threat-intelligence gathering, acquire Counter-IED 
technologies and develop Counter-IED training (JIEDDO, 
2006). 
The early success of the Army IED Task Force 
influenced then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. 
Wolfowitz to transform the entity into a Joint IED Task 
Force. Reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary, the task 
force was able to leverage the experience and expertise of 
warfighters across the DoD, enhance its network attack 
focus, increase the acquisition of device-defeat tools and 
build a robust set of IED-specific force training 
operations. In February 2006, DoD Directive 2000.19E 
converted the joint task force into a permanently-manned 
entity comprised of military, government civilians, and 
contractors: the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO, 
2006).  
B. VISUAL INDICATORS 
 Although technology exists to detect concealed explosive 
devises on people, they are not 100% accurate (Committee on 
the Review of Existing and Potential Standoff, Explosives 
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Detection Techniques, 2004; Beaty et al., 2007). As such, 
it is ultimately the individual security personnel that 
assess the situation and decide on what appropriate action 
needs to be taken.  In order for those security personnel 
to make the best decision at the time, they need to have an 
understanding of visual indicators common to a suicide 
bomber.  Table 1 provides a list of visual indicators 
established by Israeli authorities and psychologists in an 
effort to help their security personnel identify potential 
suicide bombers.  
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The wearing of heavy clothing, no matter what the season. 
Long coats or skirts may be used to conceal explosive belts 
and devices.  
An unusual gait, especially a robotic walk.  This could 
indicate someone forcing or willing himself or herself to go 
through with a mission.  
Tunnel vision.  The bomber often will be fixated on the 
target and for that reason will look straight ahead.  He or 
she also may show signs of irritability, sweating, tics, and 
other nervous behavior. (The Al Qaeda terrorist Ahmed Ressam, 
who was captured at a border crossing in Washington state 
while driving a car filled with bomb-making materials, caught 
the attention of authorities because of his excessive 
sweating, furtive eyes, and other nervous movements.) 
The appearance of being drugged.  The suicide truck bomber 
who attacked the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983 had 
been drugged before the attack and was tied to the seat of 
his vehicle. 
Signs of drug use – including, for example, enlarged pupils, 
a fixed stare, and erratic behavior. 
Bags or backpacks (used to carry explosives, nails, and other 
shrapnel). The bomber generally holds his/her bag or backpack 
tightly, sometimes gingerly, and may refuse to be separated 
from it.  
A fresh shave – a male with a fresh shave and lighter skin on 
his lower face may be a religious Muslim zealot who has just 
shaved his beard so as not to attract attention, and to blend 
in better with other people in the vicinity. 
A hand in the pocket and/or tightly gripping something – this 
could be someone clutching a detonator or a trigger for an 
explosive device. Such triggers, which may be designed in the 
form of a button, usually are rather stiff so that they will 
not be set off accidentally. (One Israeli acquaintance 
described how he and several guards shot a would-be bomber 
numerous times, but found his twitching finger still on the 
button – and still posing a danger, therefore.)  
Evasive movements. It seems obvious that anyone who tries to 
avoid eye contact, or to evade security cameras and guards, 
or who appears to be surreptitiously conducting surveillance 
of a possible target location, may be a bomber.  
Table 1.   List of visual indicators of a suicide bomber 
(From Livingstone, 2005). 
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C. THE IED THREAT 
Over the past two decades, terrorist groups have 
started resorting to the use of IEDs to advance a 
particular cause (Committee on Defeating Improvised 
Explosive Devices, 2007; Wells III & Horowitz, 2005).  Due 
to the limited skill required, IEDs are the weapon of 
choice for terrorists worldwide, giving them the ability to 
conduct spectacular attacks for a relatively small 
investment. As such, IEDs have become the number one killer 
of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Terrorists 
have realized the public relations benefit of explosive 
attacks far outweigh those of attacks using more 
conventional weapons.  
IEDs can be almost anything with any type of material, 
and with readily available explosive technologies, online 
training sources, IEDs are continuing to provide the enemy 
with inexpensive, lethal standoff weapon systems (JIEDDO, 
2006). In their annual report for FY08, JIEDDO (Meigs, 
2007) presented data showing their progress.  Figures 1-3 






















Figure 1.   IED Activity report by JIEDDO, 2003-2008 












Figure 3.   Report from Afghanistan by JIEDDO Annual 
report FY08 (From Meigs, 2007). 
An improvised explosive device is designed to destroy, 
incapacitate, harass, or distract by incorporating 
destructive, lethal, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals 
to cause death or injury (DOA, 2005).  They can be produced 
in varying designs and sizes, but always contain explosive 
materials, detonators, and a triggering mechanism.  Some of 
the most common IEDs are command-detonated, victim 
detonated, and suicide vest. This thesis is focused on the 
detection of Suicide Vest IEDs (SVIED) (JIEDDO, 2006; 
Mostak & Stancl, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Illustration of possible suicide vest IEDs. 
Note the varying materials for detection (e.g., metal, 
wires, plastic) 
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It is clear from the data in Figures 1-3 that as more 
and more terrorist organizations share information and 
realize the potential psychological, social, and political 
impacts of IEDs, this weapon will undoubtedly continue to 
be a threat to the U.S. military and coalition forces 
throughout the world (DOA, 2005). 
People who do not want to be caught with a weapon will 
go to great lengths to conceal it (Wells III & Horowitz, 
2005). Since weapons may be carried on the body in ways 
that make it unobservable to the casual eye or even a 
thorough visual search, technologies to detect these hidden 
objects are sought after (Costianes, 2005).  The ideal 
detection technology would be fast, accurate, work from 
long distances, and be safe for people.  Being able to 
detect at a safe standoff distance provides both decision 
makers and security personnel more time to accurately 
respond to the threat (McMakin et al., 1996).  The ability 
to detect threats from a standoff distance becomes critical 
when the flow of crowds is not in an organized and 
controlled manner (Chen et al., 2005). Since there is such 
a large array of different components used in making 
weapons, we need detectors that are capable of detecting 
all types of materials.  Most current systems used in 
today’s detection systems are usually designed to detect 
metal objects.  
The desired concealed weapon detection system will be 
able to detect threats in real time, at long standoff 
distances, and through clothing or other masking devices.  
Some of today’s current sensors provide few of the ideal 
capabilities, and there is currently no single sensor that 
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satisfies all these characteristics well enough to be used 
as a stand-alone system (Slamani et al., 1999). The most 
common sensors used today sense certain wavelengths in the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  These sensors are either active 
or passive (Committee on the Review of Existing and 
Potential Standoff, Explosives Detection Techniques,  
2004).  
Active sensors send low-power radiation waves in order 
to illuminate the scene.  The sensor is then able to 
measure reflected waves that reach the sensor. Passive 
systems require no illumination or applied radiation to 
operate.  The passive systems only detect electromagnetic 
waves that are already present.  As a result of the 
radiation exposure inflicted on subjects from active 
sensing, warnings are usually required to be posted with 
active detectors.  If warnings are posted, the 
effectiveness of a covert detection scheme is decreased 
(Chen et al., 2005).   
Through our research, we found that it is extremely 
difficult to detect a concealed SVIED at long range due to 
most of the current technology only providing a standoff 
distance of 10 to 50 meters (Beaty et al., 2007; Dickson, 
2008). When developing a product line for a standoff 
detection framework, scenarios and assumptions must be 
taken into consideration.  For example, we assume that an 
average person walks at a rate of 1 m/s. Therefore, if a 
standoff detector has an effective range of 30 m and a 
potential suicide bomber is approaching a checkpoint from 
30 m away, there is a 10-second window during which 
identification and appropriate action must be made before 
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the bomber is close enough to inflict major damage or 
casualties. Performing standoff detection under these tight 
time constraints requires an orthogonal systems approach 
(Knudson et al., 2009).  An orthogonal systems approach to 
standoff detection provides advantages, such as increases 
in standoff range, increased spatial resolution, and 
increased time for decisions makers. 
The two primary areas explosive detection techniques 
usually focus on are either bulk explosives or traces of 
explosives. For this thesis, we will be focusing on bulk 
explosive detection techniques. Bulk explosive detection is 
usually carried out by imaging characteristics of the 
explosive device (e.g., metal, liquid) or the explosive 
itself. Most explosives detection techniques are limited by 
fundamental physical limits or by the specific 
circumstances of a scenario, such as background 
interference (Committee on the Review of Existing and 
Potential Standoff, Explosives Detection Techniques, 2004). 
D. EXISTING DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
1. X-Ray 
For many years, X-ray technology has been used to 
search for explosives and other contraband in luggage and 
cargo containers (Mostak & Stancl, 2007).  There are some 
health concerns with the X-ray radiation being ionizing, 
but for imaging out to standoff distances of 10 to 20 
meters, the health issues may be insignificant.   
Traditional X-ray imaging, represented in Figure 5, 
requires a detector on the opposite side of the target from 
the transmitter (University of Florida, 2005). This 
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detector could be made out of low-cost plastic monitored by 
an inexpensive camera with a wireless link to a data 
analysis base.  These items can easily be concealed and 
replaced if they are damaged.  X-ray images provide good 
resolution and are able to detect shapes of objects 
shadowed as a result of their high X-ray absorption.   
Current X-ray imaging, represented in Figure 6, use 
backscatter, which collocates both the detector and 
transmitter (Committee on the Review of Existing and 
Potential Standoff, Explosives Detection Techniques, 2004).  
Since the incident and backscattered X-ray penetrate deep 
into organic materials, where atoms contain fewer electrons 
than the atoms in materials made of heavier elements, the 
organic materials appear bright on the backscattered image 




Figure 5.   Representation of traditional X-ray with 
detector being located across from transmitter (From 




Figure 6.   Representation of X-ray with backscatter and 
collocated detector and transmitter (From University 
of Florida, 2005). 
There are concerns with the potential for degreased 
quality of the transmission image with X-ray systems 
because their susceptibility to absorption in the air and 
the angular spread of the beam (Dickson, 2008).  There are 
computer tomographic X-ray images that can provide great 
detail, but they also require significantly longer times 
for scanning and data analysis.  Continued research in 
areas of X-ray imaging technology, such as high-photon flux 
X-ray sources, pulsed X-ray sources, smaller focal spots 
for scanned beams, and focused X-ray beams have potential 
to increase the standoff distance up to 15 meters (Beaty et 
al., 2007).  
The use of X-ray imaging technology brings about 
additional privacy concerns because X-ray technology 
produces images of private body parts (Transportation 
Security Administration, 2010).  This creates a difficult 
public-acceptance obstacle to overcome. A possible solution 
is to develop computer image analysis software that could 
interpret the image and eliminate the images of people that 
are clear of any potential weapon.  This could reduce the 
concerns of innocent people not wanting images of their 
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private body parts to appear on a screen for someone to 
analyze and record (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
2010).  
2. Infrared 
Infrared (IR) detectors measure the natural thermal 
radiation given off by objects that we are unable to see 
with the human eye. Any object with a temperature above 
absolute zero (-459.67 degrees Fahrenheit or -273 degrees 
Celsius) radiates in the infrared (Hermans-Killam, 2010). 
IR technologies use these properties of absorption, 
reflectance, and transmittance along with other information 
in order to calculate and display the temperature of 
objects giving off radiation.  IR detectors detect 
radiation omitted by the object of interest, as well as 
scattered radiation from the atmosphere (Kribus et al., 
2003).  
In the IR spectral range (wavelengths between 1 and 10 
microns), explosive packages, clothing, and most other 
items are opaque to radiation, but the body or other 
objects near room temperature passively emit thermal IR 
radiation. This thermal IR radiation can easily be detected 
with simple, relatively inexpensive IR imaging cameras 
(Dickson, 2008). Figure 7 depicts the radiation sources 




Figure 7.   Infrared radiation measurement from a human 
(From Dickson, 2008). 
Background radiation can have a significant impact on 
the situation when the emitted radiation from the object of 
interest is the same as the reflected background radiation 
at the wavelength of interest.  This occurs in measurements 
at moderate temperatures in a terrestrial environment using 
the 8-14µm infrared band (Kribus et al., 2003).   
Since exterior clothing used to cover the explosives 
should be slightly different in temperature than clothing 
near the skin, infrared imaging is a good technology for 
scenarios involving SVIEDs. Using the same scenario 
requirement for a standoff detection technique being able 
to detect a suicide bomber within 10 sec, the IR detection 
scheme can easily meet this timeframe requirement.  The 
ability for an IR detection scheme to filter motion video 
from a rapidly changing real-time complex scene is a major 
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advantage in standoff detection.  Some additional advantage 
of the thermal imaging technique is its simplicity and 
ability to produce an image in the absence of visible light 
(Socolinsky & Selinger, 2002).  Whether it is day or night, 
the same IR image is produced given the same conditions 
(Xue & Blum, 2003).  
One of the most significant drawbacks to infrared 
imaging in an outdoor setting is background interference, 
such as environment temperature, wind, rain, and humidity.  
This interference affects the differences in object 
temperatures and makes identifying a SVIED more difficult 
to detect (Committee on the Review of Existing and 
Potential Standoff, Explosives Detection Techniques, 2004).  
The larger the difference in temperature, the more obvious 
the threat appears.  Conversely, the smaller the difference 
in temperature, the less obvious the threat appears. For 
example, if an object is carried close to the body, over 
time, it comes into thermal equilibrium with its 
surrounding.  This makes it hard for the sensor to 
differentiate between the weapon and the rest of the body 
(McMillan et al., 2000).    
Difficulty in differentiating objects in an image also 
arises when the weapon is hidden under multiple layers of 
clothing.  This and other masking techniques cause the 
threat to appear with less contrast and diffused into the 
background (Slamani et al., 1999).  A possible solution is 
to use wavelengths longer than 20 microns, since they will 
penetrate clothing layers for detection better than shorter 
wavelengths (McMillan et al., 2000; Liu, 2006).  Another 
disadvantage is the lack of selectivity on an IR detection 
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system, which requires a person to identify a unique shape 
from an image.  Since the image may be blurred by the 
effects of thermal conduction and air convection in and 
around clothing, false readings become an issue.  
3. Terahertz 
As the radiation wavelength increases to the terahertz 
(THz) rage, wavelengths longer than 300 microns 
corresponding to 1-THz frequencies, clothing and many other 
materials become nearly transparent.  Imaging in this 
region allows detection of explosives hidden beneath 
clothing without the danger of ionizing radiation.  THz 
spectroscopy and imaging presents several advantages, such 
as high-resolution imaging and the ability to penetrate 
dielectric materials (Sullivan et al., 2007).  Excellent 
resolution can be attained when THz imaging is used in the 
scattering mode.  Although THz technology presents many 
advantages, there are limiting factors that need to be 
overcome to extend the standoff distance.  Water absorption 
presently limits the effective range of THz instruments for 
use in imaging to approximately 10 m.  However, THz imaging 
can achieve up to 100 m on a clear day.  
A potential compact, low-cost THz technology listed by 
the National Research Council in “Existing and Potential 
Standoff Explosives Detection Techniques” is the quantum 
cascade laser.  These are tiny semiconductor lasers that 
operate down in frequencies as low as 1.5 THz.  They also 
identify another potential compact source based on 
nonlinear mixing between closely spaced diode laser sources 
and Raman shifted laser lines in the infrared.  This mixing 
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is done to form coherent beams in the THz range.  One of 
the primary advantages of the shorter-wavelength THz 
regime, between 10 mW and 1 W, is enhanced image 
resolution.  Frequency ranges from 100 GHz to 1 THz provide 
the best imaging.  This frequency range provides good 
resolution at adequate standoff distances while 
encountering the least amount of absorption from the 
atmosphere and clothing (Committee on the Review of 
Existing and Potential Standoff, Explosives Detection 
Techniques, 2004). 
An example of a terahertz imaging system currently 
available on the commercial market is represented in 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8.   T5000 Terahertz imaging system (From 
ThruVision Systems Limited, 2010). 
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Figure 9.   Images from the T5000 Terahertz imaging 
system representing 25 m, 20 m, and 10 m resolution of 
an individual wearing a suicide vest (From ThurVision 
Systems Limited, 2010). 
4. Passive Millimeter Wave Radar (MMW) 
In a passive Millimeter Wave Radar (MMW) system, there 
is no dedicated transmitter emitting radio energy.  
Instead, the receiver uses scattered electromagnetic waves 
naturally emitted by objects.  The radar detects these 
scattered waves, and with the use of imaging techniques the 
waves are processed into a practical visual quantification 
of the shape of the object.  Unlike some of the other 
technologies, radar is capable of operating at night and 
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varying weather conditions (e.g., rain, fog and dust). 
Radars can also measure a variety of characteristics of a 
target such as range, direction, and speed.  
Passive MMW technology is based on measurement of 
emissivity between objects and is effective for standoff 
detection at distances around 10 m. The passive MMW 
technology does not expose people to man-made radiation, 
and is, therefore, completely harmless to all in the area.  
This passive MMW imaging approach is very effective for the 
detection of concealed weapons because its high 
transparency of clothing, and the high emissivity of human 
flesh compared to the majority of other materials. 
Continued research and development with passive millimeter 
wave imaging for explosive detection is leading to new 
technologies that offer the remote detection of not only 
metal, but also non-metal weapons, and plastic explosives 
concealed under multiple layers of clothing (Huguenin, 
2004). An example of MMW radar technology available on the 
commercial market is represented in Figure 10. 
 
 




Figure 11.   Image produced by the ST150 passive MMW 
imager detecting an individual wearing a suicide vest 
(From Sago Systems Incorporated, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 12.   SAGO Systems Inc. MMW technology used in a 
tactical checkpoint environment (From Sago Systems 
Incorporated, 2007). 
 34
5. Active Radar 
Unlike passive MMW technology, active MMW technology 
uses a transmitter and receiver.  The radar transmits radio 
frequency energy that is reflected off the body and other 
objects to generate a three-dimensional image of the person 
and anything else carried on the body in ranges up to 200 
meters (Gorman et al., 2005). 
Radars are capable of determining a target’s principal 
range (via echo time delay), speed (via Doppler shift) and 
radar cross section (via echo strength and characteristics) 
(Kingsley & Quegan, 1992).  
 
Figure 13.   Basic principle of radar operation shown for 
echoes from an aircraft (After Wolff, 2010). 
The major concern with active MMW technology is that 
the images produced show the entire body without clothes, 
exposing the genital areas, which creates privacy and 
religious concerns (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
2010). This is why passive MMW technology has become more 
popular for concealed weapon detection. However, active MMW 
technology does provide capabilities that passive MMW 
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technology does not yet provide.  The use of active MMW 
emissions provides the capabilities to penetrate common 
building materials such as concrete and brick.  This would 
allow for the observation of people and other objects 
within a room from outside that room, providing a 
significant advantage to security forces.  The security 
personnel could identify the location, posture, and 
activity before entering the room (Huguenin, 2004).   
 
Figure 14.   Images from an active MMW system (From 
Energy Probe Research Foundation, 2010). 
E. CURRENT RESEARCH CONDUCTED USING EXISTING DETECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
1. Standoff Technology Integration and Demonstration 
Program 
In September and October 2008, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Standoff Technology Integration and 
Demonstration Program conducted a field test at the Toyota 
Center in Kennewick, Washington. The program and test used 
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a spiral development approach, which involves identifying 
commercially available technical solutions; modifying or 
maturing them to meet the architecture requirements of a 
free-flowing crowd; integrating them into a system of 
systems; testing them in live operational environments; and 
providing feedback to vendors, industry, and academia. In 
the 2008 field test, the countermeasure architecture 
addressed person-borne threats in the form of suicide 
bombers and leave-behind bombs. The goals of the test were 
to evaluate a baseline integrated system architecture for 
technology performance and cost-effectiveness in a live 
venue situation.  The overhead layout of screening zones at 
the Toyota Center are shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
 
Figure 15.   Overhead view of Toyota Center showing 
screening zones (From Knudson et al., 2009). 
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Figure 16.   Illustration of sensor locations at Toyota 
Center (From Knudson et al., 2009). 
Another goal of the test was to use commercial 
technologies that would be able to operate at explosive 
standoff distances of 20 meters or greater.  Long-wave (8-
12 micron) and mid-wave (3-5 micron) infrared cameras were 
deployed to detect concealed objects, such as a suicide 
bomber’s vest, by the thermal anomaly created when these 
objects obscure thermal radiation from the body.   
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Figure 17.   Crowd surveillance with infrared camera 
(From Knudson et al., 2009). 
Several systems integration interfaces were developed 
to overcome the challenge of an unpredictable moving crowd 
environment.  A tracking and handoff system was created in 
order for two sensors to screen the same individuals.  
Also, an integrated user console was developed which 
provided the user up to three different outputs.  Each 
output had the ability to display the potential threat 
using the three detection technologies, infrared, 




acquisition and management used in the test is shown in 
Figure 18.  This illustration shows the flow of information 
used in the system. 
 
 
Figure 18.   System integration schematic (From  
Knudson et al., 2009). 
The most significant challenge during the 
characterization tests and the live operations was crowd 
density effects. During the test, Zone 1 crowd sizes 
averaged 23% singles, 44% couples, and 15% with groups of 
three, with the remaining 18% comprising groups of four or 
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more people.  Higher crowd densities resulted in blocking 
effects, lack of sufficient spacing between individuals, 
and lack of sufficient dwell time to make a threat 
determination. 
The most significant conclusions made from the Toyota 
Center field test were: 
• Longer operator training resulted increased 
accuracy of detecting concealed objects. 
• Using an orthogonal design improved the overall 
detection capabilities of the system.   
• Displaying screening results from the infrared 
and millimeter-wave systems on a single platform 
gave operators more information for interdiction 
and security decisions. 
• The overall system architecture had a number of 
limitations.  In order to apply this system to a 
large venue or massive crowd environment, the 
line-of-sight issues such as parked cars, the 
number of approach angles, and standoff distance 
requirements must be fulfilled by employing more 
sensors. 
2. Center for Subsurface Sensing and Imaging Systems 
In 2007, the Center for Subsurface Sensing and Imaging 
Systems (CenSSIS), funded by the Department of Homeland 
Security, supported the research performed by Northeastern 
University and industry partners called “BomDetec – Wide 
Area Surveillance and Suicide Bomber Detection.”  The 
BomDetec system experimented with the development a 
detection system capable of locating suicide bombers at 
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distances sufficient to prevent them from approaching 
densely populated or strategically important areas. 
The intent of their research was to synthesize four 
technologies—intelligent video, radar, X-ray, and 
terahertz–into one system to detect suicide bombers up to 
50 meters.  Their methodology uses the intelligent video to 
find a suspicious individual, and then have the other three 
sensors aimed at the individual and scan for the presence 
or absence of explosive material.  The radar can be used at 
distances of 50 meters, while the X-ray and terahertz are 
used at distances of 10 meters or less.   The schematic for 
their proposed system is shown in Figure 19.   
 
 
Figure 19.   Proposed BomDetec system operation (From 
Beaty et al., 2007). 
 42
Northeastern University is working with several 
industry partners: American Science and Engineering (AS&E), 
PPT, Raytheon, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), and 
Siemens. Siemens is working on the development of the 
intelligent video systems. The purpose of intelligent video 
is to enable the system operator or security personnel to 
locate suspicious behavior or appearance visually at 
distances exceeding 50 meters and to isolate individuals 
for further detection.  Figure 20 is a screen capture of 
the intelligent video system tracking several individuals.   
 
Figure 20.   Intelligent video screen shot (From Beaty et 
al., 2007). 
Northeastern University, PPT, and Raytheon are working 
on the development of the millimeter-wave radar system to 
detect metal objects up to 50 meters in distance.  Figure 
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21 and Figure 22 show the beam width of the transmitted 
radar wave and the back scatter return showing a radiation 




Figure 21.   MMW Radar emission illustration (From Beaty 




Figure 22.   Backscatter return of radar waves detecting 
a suicide vest (From Beaty et al., 2007). 
The X-ray backscatter system is being developed by 
AS&E.  This system is designed to be used at distances of 
10 – 20 meters. X-Ray backscatter provides more resolution 
than does the radar system and can provide information, 
such as location on body and shape, about the explosives. 
The Terahertz radiation technology research is being 
headed by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. This technology 
will be used to examine suspects at the closest distances, 
0 – 10 meters, in order to confirm the presence of 
explosive materials. THz technology exploits the absorption 
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spectra that are specific to certain molecules in order to 
identify dangerous materials, since many molecules show 
sharp absorption features in the THz range. 
Further research in the BomDetec system will be to 
continue to find suitable sensors for detection and to 
integrate all the individual sensors and technologies into 
one mobile system. 
3. Sensing and Detecting Wires for IED Detection 
The research conducted by Professor William Fox and 
Professor John Vesecky from the Naval Postgraduate School 
and Kenneth Laws from the University of California at Santa 
Cruz, called “Sensing and Identifying People Carrying Wires 
on their Body for IED Detonation,” dealt with developing 
NEC simulations and gathering experimental data using a 
GunnPlexer Doppler radar to detect wires and metallic 
objects on people.  One of the main purposes of the 
research was to find metrics that could be used to build 
models for detection rates.  They determined the best 
metric was the Vertical-Vertical/Horizontal-Horizontal 
ratio of the radar cross section.   
The conclusions drawn from their empirical modeling 
showed that the VV/HH ratio for people wearing wires was 
different from people without wearing wires at level of 
significance α = 0.05 (Fox et al., 2009).  They created a 
simulation of a crowd of people and randomly picked people 
with wires on their body.  Using their calculated metric 
and a experimentally determined threshold value, they were 
able to pick out the person wearing wires on their body 
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83.4% of the time, with a false alarm rate of picking 
individuals who were not wearing wires 22% of the time (Fox 
et al., 2009).  
The illustration, Figure 23, is the proposed detection 
scheme used.  It incorporates the Doppler radar with a 
video system.  The video images are used to compute the 
position and velocities history of the individuals as they 
walk through the field of view.  The video system is also 
used to characterize the individuals from which the radar 
system will single out individuals who have wires on their 
body. The main objective of the radar system is to detect 
the individuals who have wires on their bodies based on the 









The conclusions of the research found that CW Doppler 
radar in the frequency range from 0.5 to 3.0 GHz was the 
best for detecting wires on a person.  Radar frequencies at 
10 GHz produced radar cross sections of the human body that 
are too large to differentiate between individuals with 
wires and without wires.  Using a polarization metric 
alone, they found that in order to get the best signal-to-
clutter ratio, the frequency band of the radar should be 
from 0.7 to 2.6 GHz.  In this frequency, the signal-to-
clutter ratio was above 10 dB overall the band (Fox et al., 
2009).  Also, using a Gunnplexer, they were able to detect 
wires on a body in various configurations.  The best metric 
determined was using a radar cross section VV/HH 
polarization ratio.  Using this metric, they were able to 
detect wires on a person with a success rate of 83.4% (Fox 
et al., 2009). 
4. Infrared Camera Used for Suicide Bomb Detection 
The master’s thesis “Handheld infrared camera use for 
suicide bomb detection: feasibility of use for thermal 
model comparison,” written by Matthew Dickson at Kansas 
State University, determines the feasibility of modeling 
the heat signature produced by a suicide bomber.  The heat 
signatures are then compared to images of human subjects.  
The purpose of the research is to create a detection system 
using the models created as a comparator and signal for 
positive detection of a suicide bomber. 
One of the main conclusions from Dickson’s research 
was that the detection ranges using the thermal imagers 
could not distinguish the temperature difference at 
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distances greater than 25 feet.  More powerful thermal 
images or imagers with a telephoto lens must be used to 
extend the detection range greater than 25 ft. 
Another conclusion from Dickson is that one sensor 
cannot alone detect a suicide bomber.  Multiple sensors of 
different technologies must be used and the data from the 
sensors must be fused.  Fusing the data allows for 
supporting information, which leads to more accurately 
detecting suicide bombers with fewer false alarms and false 
positives.   
The last major conclusion from Dickson’s research is 
the ability of the system to detect and determine small 
temperature differentials.  The human eye has no problem 
distinguishing a large temperature differential on a 
person; however, as the temperature gradient decreases, the 
human eye has problems accurately detecting potential 
threats.  In order for a system to run without human 
discretion, computers must be able to differentiate small 
temperature changes and alert the operator.   
In Dickson’s testing, he found that over a temperature 
scale of 45° F, there needed to be a temperature difference 
of 3° F to be reasonably certain an object was underneath 
the individual’s clothing (Dickson, 2008).  This equated to 
a threshold of at least a 7 – 10 % temperature change of 
the object on the person’s torso compared to the 
temperature of the torso for the given temperature scale 
used on the thermal imager (Dickson, 2008).  
Figure 24 is the flowchart showing the basic operation 
of a thermal imaging system with a computer and human 
decision factor.  Figure 25 is the algorithm used by 
Dickson to indentify concealed objects using a thermal 
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imager.  Figures 26 and 27 are images taken from Dickson’s 
research showing the same metallic pipe bomb from distances 
of 25 feet and 6 feet.   
 
Figure 24.   Possible infrared camera system operation 


























Figure 25.   Guide to finding a bomb with infrared camera 





Figure 26.   Metal bomb package shielded by one T-shirt 
at 25 feet (From Dickson, 2008). 
 
Figure 27.   Metal bomb package shielded by one T-shirt 
at 6 feet (From Dickson, 2008). 
 52
5. Millimeter-Wave and Lower Terahertz 
The researched performed by Naomi Alexander et al., 
called “Suicide Bomber Detection” focused on using 
millimeter-waves and lower Terahertz waves to image objects 
and explosives worn underneath an individual’s clothing. 
Radiation in the millimeter-wave and the lower 
Terahertz range, having the useful property of 
being able to penetrate clothing in addition to 
fog and rain, makes it a clear candidate for 
imaging under various weather conditions whilst 
avoiding contact between Force Protection 
personnel and potential suicide bombers. 
(Alexander et al., 2009) 
The frequencies they used were 35, 94, and 220 GHz. 
The main objectives of their study were to 
characterize the transmission and reflection properties of 
the most commonly worn fabrics and explosive suicide vest 
materials.  They also obtained images simulating real case 
scenarios to test practical detection ranges and standoff 
distances.  The images were taken indoors and outdoors in 
order to study the affects of the environment on the 
imager.  Lastly, they preformed an analysis of their trial 
results to determine the ideal imager operating frequency 
for the best standoff range.   
They made several significant conclusions from their 
study.  The first finding was that as the operating 
frequency of the imager increases, the detection capability 
increases, with the optimum frequency at 94 GHz.  However, 
from the research, they found that the transmission of the 
materials experimented increases with decreasing frequency.  
This means that the materials in which the imager is most 
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looking for are more transparent at 35 GHz than at 94 GHz, 
which makes them more difficult to detect (Alexander et 
al., 2009).  
The research also revealed that indoor detection 
capability is very high.  The main reason for this finding 
is that there is minimal radiation from the outside 
environment affecting the imager.  They were able to detect 
threats 80% of the time at every standoff distance in 
indoor simulations.  The detection limit is a function of 
the imager resolution.  They concluded that the minimum-
sized object that can be detected with the imager at a 
standoff distance (d) is approximately:  
 
Size(m) = 6.5 x 10-3  • d (Alexander et al., 2009). 
 
In outdoor situations, the detection capability is 
much lower than the indoor capability. The detection rate 
was less than 50% in outdoor simulations.  They did find 
that the detection rates can increase when comparisons are 
made to the threat and no-threat images.  The research team 
made several recommendations to help increase the outdoor 
detection rates.  The first was to have extensive operator 
training in order to indentify less resolute 
characteristics on the images.  Another recommendation is 
to develop a standard set of no-threat images that could 
then be used for comparison to the actual images taken of 
potential suspects.   
The last conclusions they made were that the larger 
the surface area of the threat object, the more pixels will 
be used to represent the object on the imager.  This will 
make the object easier to detect because it will standout 
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from the background.  Lastly, they found that the only 
atmospheric condition that affects the imager was the 
temperature in the indoor simulations.  If the temperature 
contrast is decreased, the detection capability decreases.  
Humidity, fog, and rain had little to no affect on the 
imager capability (Alexander et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 28.   MMW and Terahertz images of an individual 
with no threat on the body (From Alexander et al., 
2009). 
Figure 28 represents indoor images of an individual 
with no threat or object on the body.  Caption (a) is using 
35 GHz at 2.65 meters.  Caption (b) is 94 GHz at 2.65 
 55
meters.  Caption (c) is a visible image taken at 2.65 
meters.  Caption (d) is 35 GHz at 9.9 meters.  Caption (e) 
is 94 GHz at 9.9 meters.  Caption (f) is a visible image at 
9.9 meters.   
 
 
Figure 29.   MMW and Terahertz images of an individual 
with TNT on the body (From Alexander et al., 2009). 
Figure 29 represents images taken of an individual 
wearing a suicide vest made of TNT with a cotton robe. 
Caption (a) is at 94 GHz from 2.65 meters.  Caption (b) is 
a visible image from 2.65 meters.  Caption (c) is 94 GHz at 
9.9 meters.  Caption (d) is a visible image at 9.9 meters.   
6. Future Research Technology 
Future technology: The System and Method for Standoff 
Detection of Human Carried Explosives is a patent submitted 
in November 2005.  The design was created by John Gorman, 
Robert Douglass, and Thomas Burns Jr.  This system is 
designed to be portable and automatically detect explosives 
carried on humans up to distances of 200 meters.  The 
sensors incorporated in the design are radar, with center 
frequencies operating between 10 – 100 GHz, and visual 
cameras, which may include at least one Ladar, Lidar, 
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infrared, multispectral, hyperspectral, or imaging radar, 
which are all controlled by a multi-sensor processor.   
The processor receives data from the radar and visual 
cameras and atomically tracks individuals in the field of 
view.  The system works by continually tracking individuals 
and cueing the narrow beam radar on the individual of 
interest.  As the radar continually collects data on the 
individual, over time, the data is fused producing range 
profiles and associated features until sufficient evidence 
is produced to determine if explosives are present or not 
present.  Once a determination is made, the system alerts 
the user via a handheld display.  To date, no field tests 
have been performed with this design.  Figure 30 is the 
flowchart showing the sequence of operations for the 
detection method, and Figure 31 is an illustration of the 

















Figure 31.   Illustration of system using radar and 
visual camera (From Gorman et al., 2005). 
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III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
A. METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK  
1. Purpose 
The purpose of our methodology is to propose an 
accurate detection system that can identify a suicide 
bomber at an adequate explosive safety standoff distance. 
According to Explosive Ordinance Disposal guidelines, a 
safe standoff distance is proportional to the cube root of 
the net explosive weight of the explosives used in the 
device, multiplied by a destructive factor.  A typical 
suicide bomber with 30 lbs of explosives results in a safe 
standoff distance of 100 meters (Gorman et al., 2005).   
This methodology recommends multiple sensors, each 
with a unique type of technology.  The accuracy of each 
detection system will be determined by the ability of the 
system to identify a suicide bomber when there is a suicide 
bomber actually present and in detection range of the 
sensor(s), and for the system to not identify a suicide 
bomber when there are no suicide bombers present.  The 
detection system will use the sensors orthogonally.  An 
orthogonal system involves using different independent 
technologies for detection.  Independent sensors will scan 
the intended environment, either actively or passively, for 
threat indicators.  As the sensors continue to scan and 
receive indicators of a suicide bomber with an explosive 
vest and wires, the data from all the sensors will be fused 
together to determine if there is an actual threat present.    




Figure 32.   Baseline methodology framework (After 
Committee on the Review of Existing and Potential 
Standoff, Explosives Detection Techniques, 2004). 
The proposed system works by having one or many 
sensors scan the environment.  The sensors may be placed in 
the same location or spread out over different locations in 
order to scan a larger portion of the environment.  The 
system works independently of where the sensors are placed.  
The data from each sensor is fed into a central processing 
unit, indicated by the dashed circle in Figure 32.  If one 
sensor has scanned and received data from an individual but 
needs amplifying information to accurately determine if a 
suicide vest and wires are present, then the system will 
automatically aim another sensor to begin prosecuting the 
same individual to receive more data. The system will have 
the ability to automatically aim sensors at a target by 
using video tracking systems. The tracking system will be 
controlled in the central processing unit. The central 
processing unit also includes the comparison algorithms 
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that fuse the data from the multiple sensors.  The 
comparison algorithms are constructed using the sensors in 
a parallel or series sequence based on sensor detection 
ranges and location of the sensor in relation to the 
intended target environment. 
a. Orthogonal Detection  
The advantage of using an orthogonal detection 
system of multiple sensors is that the sensitivity and 
specificity is increased for the overall system.   The 
sensitivity is the ability of the system to identify 
explosive vests if an explosive vest is present.  This 
increases because the use of multiple independent sensors 
will be able to detect more of the possible indicators of 
an explosive vest.  The specificity is the ability of the 
system to identify explosive vests only if an explosive 
vest is present.   This is increased because more sensor 
types are used in an orthogonal system and each sensor 
independently detects indicators of an explosive vest only 
when an explosive vest is actually present.  The orthogonal 
detection system will also reduce the probability of false 
alarms.  This happens because the different independent 
sensor types are less likely to report false positives at 
the same time.   
b. Detection Thresholds  
The proposed detection system must be able to 
fuse and analyze data at real-time speeds.  This is needed 
so the user of the system can have the most amount of time 
in order to make a security decision.  Each sensor will 
gather data from the environment, then process and analyze 
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the data resulting in a value that is used to determine the 
strength of detection that a suicide vest is present.  The 
processed values are compared to threshold values 
corresponding to each sensor.  If the processed value is 
above a high-level threshold, then that is a strong 
positive indicator of a suicide vest.  The sensor has 
identified a clear and evident characteristic of a suicide 
vest. If two or more processed values from separate sensors 
are above a low-level threshold, then this is also a 
positive indicator of a suicide vest.  Since two different 
and independent sensors are identifying different minute 
characteristics of a suicide vest, they system determines 
that this is enough information to support the presence of 
a suicide bomber. If the processed values are below the 
low-level threshold, then there is no indication of a 
suicide vest and the sensors will continue to scan the 
environment.   
As indicated in the previous paragraph, each 
sensor will have a corresponding low-level threshold 
parameter value, γS, and high-level threshold parameter 
value, ηS.  These values are a function of the specific 
sensor used and the distance or range that the sensor is 
used when scanning a potential suicide bomber.  These 
values will need to be predetermined and calculated based 
on field tests and computer simulations for each sensor.  
Using the best values for these parameters is critical for 
the individual and overall sensitivity and specificity of 
the sensors and the system as a whole.  
The processed values are different for each 
sensor.  Certain sensors are able to receive and present a 
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quantitative value.  Active Radar waves are able to 
transmit electromagnetic waves and detect the returned wave 
and measure the cross sectional area of a target.  The size 
of the cross sectional area and the strength of the signal 
received is proportional to the amount of metallic material 
on the target.   
Infrared imaging sensors are able to detect a 
temperature differential and relative size of an object on 
a person from its received background image.  If the 
temperature differential of the object compared to the 
person on which the object is on is large enough, the 
object will be more noticeable on the display and easier to 
decipher.  
These processed values from the sensors must be 
compared to a pre-calculated value in order to determine if 
there is a threat.  The pre-calculated values are the 
threshold values for the sensors.  The threshold values are 
determined from running simulations and field tests.  For 
the Radar, experimentation can determine that the signal 
strength, frequency, and size of the radar cross sectional 
area correspond to a specific amount of metallic material 
on a person.  If the high-level threshold for the Radar is 
set to X meters2, and the Radar is receiving a radar cross 
sectional area that is greater then X meters2, then that 
Radar sensor is detecting a threat over the high-level 
threshold. 
This concept is the same for the infrared sensor. 
The threshold values are determined from conducting field 
test and simulations.  If the high-level threshold value is 
set at Y degrees temperature difference, and the infrared 
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sensor is sensing an object on a person that varies in 
temperature above Y degrees, then the infrared sensor is 
detecting a threat over the high-level threshold.   
Separate from active Radar and Infrared, 
Millimeter-wave, Terahertz, and X-ray are passive sensors 
that receive and process data that is qualitative in the 
form of images.  Due to the time constraints while 
detecting suicide bombers, it is not feasible for users of 
these sensors to analyze the images, compare the image to 
images with suicide vest characteristics, and determine if 
there is a potential threat.  Computer image analysis 
software must be utilized to process the images and 
determine if there is a threat. The image analysis software 
must be able to compare the images from the sensor to 
images and data compiled from simulations and field tests. 
Data from field tests and simulations compose images, 
images of individuals with and without suicide vests or 
explosives on their body, taken at various angles, 
distances, and temperatures. The more exact the sensor 
image characteristics match the image characteristics in 
the software, then the stronger the detection of a threat.  
The low-level and high-level threshold values for each 
sensor are determined by how accurate an image matches an 
image in the image analysis software.   
For example, the high-level threshold for a 
Terahertz sensor could be set for a 75% match. If the 
Terahertz sensor receives an image, and the image is 
processed using image analysis software that produces a 80% 
match to pre-processed and stored image, then the Terahertz 
sensor is detecting a threat over the high-level threshold. 
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Sensor 
High-level Threshold      
η 
Low-level Threshold      
• Metric 
Radar RCS 1 0.3 
Ratio of VV/HH 
Radar Cross 
Section Area 




Infrared 7% 3% 
Percent 
Temperature 




X-ray 90% 50% 
Image analysis 
match 
Millimeter-wave 90% 50% 
Image analysis 
match 
Terahertz 90% 50% 
Image analysis 
match 
Table 2.    Detection threshold values.  
2. Users of the System 
After the detection system determines that a suicide 
bomber is present, the final step in the system is to 
initiate a response to the user.  It should be solely up to 
the user, with their commander’s guidelines and intentions, 
to determine what the next course of action is after a 
suicide bomber has been identified. Standard operating 
procedures and rules of engagement will factor in on how 
each situation is handled.  The purpose of the system is to 
detect suicide bombers at an adequate standoff distance, 
which will allow the users more time to make a decision. 
The more time the users of the system have to make security 
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and force protection decisions, there will be minimal 
damage and lethality to surrounding infrastructure and 
people.  
The baseline methodology will be applied to two 
scenarios that have real-world implications.  The first 
scenario will be a security checkpoint.  The second 
scenario will be an open area to the public or marketplace.   
B. CHECKPOINT SCENARIO 
1. Checkpoint Definition 
Security checkpoints are normally erected and 
controlled within adjoining areas under military or law 
enforcement control. Security checkpoints have been 
employed within conflict-ridden areas all over the world to 
monitor and control the movement of people and materials in 
order to prevent violence. Most notably are the checkpoints 
along the Israeli and Palestinian borders, and the security 
checkpoints in Iraq. Checkpoints have also been used in 
less hostile regions or situations.  Examples are large 
public gatherings such as events at the Olympic Games or 
The Super Bowl.  In both the military and civilian 
examples, the purpose of the checkpoint to is screen people 
as they pass from an unsecure area into a secure area.   
The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07-22 states that 
checkpoints are set up to check and control the movement of 
personnel, vehicles, and materiel, and prevent actions that 
aid the enemy. During counterinsurgency operations, such as 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, checkpoints assist the commander 
in maintaining the initiative against the insurgents by 
disrupting, interfering with, and deterring insurgent 
operations, and disrupting the insurgents’ decision making 
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cycle. The field manual also states that it is important to 
conduct checkpoints and roadblocks with interpreters, host 
nation police, or other host nation security forces (DOA, 
2004). 
2. Purpose of Detection System at Checkpoints 
The probability of suicide bomber attacks against U.S. 
troops and its allies while deployed in hostile regions of 
the world continues to remain high.  All of the checkpoints 
and entry control points are not equipped with the 
equipment to screen for suicide bombers at a standoff 
distance.  The ideal use of the detection system is to scan 
and identify people at a safe standoff distance that avoids 
unnecessary contact between security personnel and 
potential suicide bombers.  The standoff distance is the 
distance from the approaching potential suicide bomber to 
the actual checkpoint or the area where crowds gather 
waiting to pass through the checkpoint.  Adequate standoff 
distance shall be any distance greater than 10 meters, but 
the further the distance the better  (Committee on the 
Review of Existing and Potential Standoff, Explosives 
Detection Techniques, 2004). 
Although people can approach a checkpoint from 
multiple directions, security personnel can take positive 
control of the situation by directing and funneling people 
into lanes or lines that lead to the checkpoint.  Having 
the approaching people in an organized formation or line 
creates the ideal scenario for using the sensors. A 




people. This allows more time for the sensors and the 
security personnel’s vision to focus on the people at 
further distances.   
 
 
Figure 33.   Individuals approaching a checkpoint. 
Many times at checkpoints, as in Figure 33, large 
crowds can congregate, which make it more difficult to 
indentify suicide bombers.  This is a key reason why long-





Figure 34 is an illustration of an Israeli checkpoint 
along the Palestinian border.  Concrete barriers are used 
to control the flow of pedestrian traffic and direct people 
towards the checkpoint.   
 
 
Figure 34.   Israeli checkpoint with barriers to control 
approaching people. 
3. Checkpoint Detection System Operation 
Figure 35 illustrates the sequence and operation of 
the detection system for a checkpoint.  The checkpoint 
detection system applies the baseline detection 
methodology, Figure 32, but uses the sensors based on their 
respective detection ranges.  There is a long-range 
detection operation and a short-range detection operation.  
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The detection distance that distinguishes the two sets of 
operations is 10 meters.   This is due to the detection 
ranges of the X-ray, Terahertz, and MMW sensors.  All three 
of these sensors have a maximum range of 10 meters, while 
the Infrared and Radar sensors have ranges that can be used 
up to 100 meters.   
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Figure 35.   Checkpoint detection flowchart. 
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a. Long Range Detection 
The methodology for a checkpoint is structured to 
work in a sequence based on the detection distances of the 
sensors.  As discussed earlier, this will allow for the 
detection of suicide vests at the furthest range possible, 
resulting in the best standoff from the checkpoint.  The 
Infrared and Radar sensors can both be used up to distances 
of 100 meters.  However, this does not prevent these 
sensors from scanning and tracking individuals as they move 
closer to the checkpoint entrance.  Figure 36 shows a 
simplified view of the long-range sensors.  The sensor in  
Figure 36 is aimed at the individual.  The range of 
detection (R), is the standoff distance which can be up to 
100 meters.  The data from the sensor is fed to the central 
processing unit, which is displayed to the users. 
 
 




At ranges up to 100 meters, the Infrared and 
Radar sensors will be scanning approaching people.  They 
can work in unison or independent of each other.  As Figure 
35 depicts, one or both of the sensors scans and receives 
data. The Infrared sensor scans passively and indicates 
temperature differentials on a person.  If the temperature 
differential found on a person is above both the low-level 
threshold γIR and high-level threshold ηIR, the system will 
initiate a response indicating that at the scanned range, 
there is a strong indication that the person is wearing a 
suspicious device indicative of a suicide vest. If the 
temperature differential found on a person is only above 
the low-level threshold, the system will need further 
information and will continue to scan and monitor 
approaching people.   
The Radar sensor works in a similar fashion but 
is an active scanner.  The Radar sensor generates and 
pulses an electromagnetic wave at the approaching people 
and receives a return wave.  The return wave produces data 
in the form of a radar cross sectional area.  The larger 
the signal of the cross sectional area, the larger amount 
of metallic material is on a person.  If the cross 
sectional area signal strength of a person is above the 
low-level threshold γRadar and high-level threshold ηRadar, the 
system will initiate a response to the user, indicating 
that at the scanned range, a person has a strong indication 
of wearing a suicide vest based on the amount of metal 
found on the person’s body.  If the cross sectional area of 
a person is only above the low-level threshold γRadar, the 
system will need further information and will also continue 
to scan and monitor approaching people.   
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In the case where both sensors received data that 
was only above their respective low-level thresholds and 
not above their respective high-level thresholds, the 
system will also initiate a response.  The flow chart shows 
that when data from a sensor is above its low level 
threshold but below its high-level threshold, it is sent to 
a decision node.  This decision node receives data from all 
the sensors meeting this criterion.  When the same 
individual is scanned from two or more sensors and the data 
from the sensors meet this criterion, the system will 
initiate a response to the user that there is a strong 
indication that the person is wearing a suicide vest.  
b. Short Range Detection 
The next process of the flow chart involves the 
sensors that have a maximum detection range up to 10 
meters.  There are three technologies used: X-ray, 
Terahertz, and MMW.  The principle function of these three 
sensors works the same as IR and Radar.  Any one of the 
three sensors can be used to scan an individual as well as 
up to all three sensors used to scan an individual.  The 
data from all short-range sensors will also be combined 
(fused) and analyzed.  An illustration of the short-range 
sensors working together is shown in Figure 37.  The 
sensors are continually scanning individuals as they are 
making their way toward the checkpoint.  All the data from 
the sensors are being fed into a central processing unit.  
The data from the long-range sensors will also be combined 
and (fused) with the data from the short-range sensors when 
the long range sensors have tracked an individual into 
ranges closer than 10 meters.   
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Figure 37.   Short-range detection sensors (After 
Costianes, 2005). 
If data from any one of the three short-range 
sensors is above their respective high-level threshold ηS, 
then the detection system will acknowledge this as a strong 
indication of a suicide vest and initiate a response to the 
user.  If the data from two or more sensors are above their 
respective low-level threshold γS, then the detection system 
will also acknowledge this as a strong indication of a 
suicide vest and initiate a response to the user.  The 
process of the short-range sensors scanning and combining 
data from each other as well as combining any data from the 
long-range sensors is a constantly occurring through the 
feedback loop in the detection system.   
The last and final process, after individuals 
reach the checkpoint without any sensors resulting in a 
response from the detection system, is for security 
personnel to conduct a pat down or magnetic wand search for 
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any explosive or metallic material that was not found by 
the sensors.  Figure 38 shows an Israeli soldier conduct a 
security search on an individual before they can pass 
through the checkpoint.   
 
 
Figure 38.   Israeli soldier conducting personnel search 
at a checkpoint. 
C. MARKETPLACE SCENARIO 
1. Marketplace Definition 
The next scenario for applying a suicide bomber 
detection system is in a marketplace or any public area in 
which large crowds gather.  Examples can be town centers or 
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public transportation stations.   This type of setting is 
much more difficult to detect and indentify a suicide 
bomber than a checkpoint.  The difficulty increases because 
there are many ways to enter and exit a marketplace or 
public area, and the amount of people and crowd size makes 
its very demanding for the sensors to accurately pinpoint 
an individual.   Unlike the checkpoint, in which security 
can take positive control of the crowds by corralling them, 
security personnel cannot control the movement of people in 
the marketplace.  The movement of people is chaotic, 
sporadic, and unpredictable.   
Figure 39 is the Dora Marketplace in Baghdad.  This is 
a typical outdoor Iraqi marketplace with local civilians 
shopping.   The area is open, with several ways to enter 
and exit, either through the streets or adjacent buildings.  
Also, the people can move as they please throughout the 
area.  There are no control points to monitor foot traffic.  
During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 




Figure 39.   Dora Marketplace. 
2. Suicide Bomber Attacks in Marketplaces 
An example of the scope and complexity that is 
required to identify a suicide bomber is illustrated in the 
photos below.  Figure 40 is a picture of a market in 
Lahore, Pakistan, taken on December 2009.  The street is 
flooded with shoppers, making it difficult for any security 
personnel to find suspicious-looking individuals who could 




Figure 40.   Marketplace in Lahore, Pakistan. 
 In the same market in Lahore, on December 9, 2009, two 
suicide bombers entered into the crowds of shoppers and 
diners.  Within seconds, the two suicide bombers detonated 
themselves, killing 51 people and wounding over 140 more.  
Ball bearings were found around the blast sight, indicating 
that the two suicide bombers packed their explosives with 
the ball bearings to increase fragmentation and lethality.   
Figures 41 and 42 show the damaging effects from the two 






















Figure 42.   Lahore Marketplace explosion damage. 
As discussed and shown above, a marketplace is a much 
more complex scenario to detect and identify a suicide 
bomber.   Military, law enforcement, or other security 
agencies will never be able to stop all attacks. However, 
in a high-probability target area, setting up a detection 
system will increase chance of identifying a suicide 
bomber.  Kaplan and Kress state that suicide bomber 
detectors and sensors can play an important role for the 
use of known targets. However, detection systems are not 
likely to prove effective in protecting civilian 
populations from random attacks.  Simply stated, there are 
not enough sensors to have in every public place to detect 
every potential suicide bomber (Kaplan & Kress, 2005).   
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3. Marketplace Detection System Operation 
Applying the baseline methodology to a marketplace or 
any public area, one of which is considered of value or a 
known target, would have to consist of an array layout of 
multiple sensors spread throughout the area.  All sensors 
would be in operating in their respective detection ranges 
that makes it possible to have all different sensor 
technologies focus in on a certain area.  Similar to the 
checkpoint methodology, all the data from the sensors will 
be sent to a central control unit to fuse and analyze.    
Figure 43 shows a simple illustration of the sensor 
positioning for a marketplace scenario.  A single sensor or 
a group of sensors are positioned in three different areas.  
They are labeled as “Detection System.”  Each Detection 
System is able to scan the area using different sensor 
technologies and to scan the area from contrasting angles 
or viewpoints.  This allows for a more complete area of the 
environment to get scanned.  All the data from the 
Detection Systems are fed into the Secure Area that houses 
the processing unit to fuse and analyze the data at real-





Figure 43.   Possible marketplace sensor positioning 
(After Gorman et al., 2005). 
Figure 44 shows a potential layout of the sensors over 
a larger area, such as a city block.  The illustration is a 
depiction from the Kaplan and Kress report, “Operational 
effectiveness of suicide-bomber-detector schemes: A best-
case analysis.” At each location where a “Sensor” is shown, 
there can either be a single sensor or several sensors, 
making it its own detection system, as shown in Figure 43.  
Thus, the system as a whole can be viewed as a system of 
smaller systems. This expands the area in which the entire 
detection system can scan.  Instead of the sensors focusing 
in on a small area or section of a marketplace, the system 
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as a whole can now have the ability to view a much larger 
portion of the environment and track individuals as they 
move throughout the area.   
 
Figure 44.   Sensor layouts in a city block (After Kaplan 
& Kress, 2005). 
The flowchart and sensing methodology is depicted in 
Figure 45.  The process is adopted from the baseline 
detection methodology shown in Figure 32.  The sequence of 
operations for a marketplace scenario incorporates using 
all the different sensor technologies in a parallel 
process.  This is similar to the checkpoint methodology 
except all the sensors can be scanning an individual at the 
same time; there is no distinguishing range or operation 
distance.  This is a result of having the sensors 
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positioned in different locations from each other and in 
relation to the area they are scanning. 
The system will work by having one, all, or any 
combination of the sensors working and scanning 
simultaneously.  As the sensors receive data, they will 
compare it to their respective low-level threshold values, 
ηS, and high-level threshold values, γS.  If one or more 
sensors receive data that is above the high-level 
threshold, then the system will initiate a response to the 
users that there is a strong indication of a suicide vest.   
If a sensor receives data that is above its low-level 
threshold value but below the high-level value, the system 
does not initiate any response to the user.  The system 
will have the sensor continue to scan the individual incase 
the sensor data increases above the high-level threshold.  
Also, the system will automatically aim other sensors that 
are in range to the individual to receive supplemental 
data.  As the system continues to scan and receive data 
from two or more sensors, all the sensor data is fused 
together in a central processing unit.  If any of the 
additional sensors now aimed at the individual receive data 
that is above their respective low-level threshold, then 
there are now at least two sensors that are receiving data 
that is above their low-level threshold.  Meeting this 
criterion will have the system initiate a response to the 
user that there is a strong indication that the individual 
scanned is wearing a suicide vest. 
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Figure 45.   Marketplace detection flowchart.
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IV. METHODOLOGY TESTING 
A. CONCEPT FOR TESTING 
The focus of this thesis is to propose a suicide 
bomber standoff detection methodology that can be 
incorporated in multiple military environments to increase 
the probability of detecting a human born IED prior to 
detonation.  Since there is currently no standoff detection 
system being actively used by the military to detect a 
human born IED prior to detonation, the only method for 
detecting a suicide bomber is with the human eye, which is 
dependent on the IED being visible.  Using this as the 
current baseline, our goal is to identify current 
technologies that when fused together with other 
technologies in an orthogonal system can identify a 
possible suicide bomber at a standoff distance adequate for 
a response that prevents the detonation or reduces the 
number of casualties. 
The conception of this thesis was based on previous 
research using radar to identifying people carrying wires 
on their body for IED detonation conducted by Professor 
William Fox, Naval Postgraduate School, and Professor John 
Vesecky and Kenneth Laws from the University of California 
at Santa Cruz.  We expanded on their research by 
incorporating the capabilities of X-ray, infrared, 
terahertz, and passive millimeter wave technologies.  Our 
goal for this research is to incorporate the capabilities 
of these five technologies into an orthogonal system that 
fuses the data from each sensor to determine if an 
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individual wearing an IED is present in the crowd and 
identify that individual to the security forces.   
B. MODEL DESIGN 
We were unable to obtain the technologies used in our 
proposed standoff detection system for field-testing and 
data collection, so we relied on a software model to test 
the probability of detecting a suicide bomber in a crowd of 
people given the stated capabilities of the various 
technologies.  The original model was created by Fox et al. 
for their research using radar cross sections to identify 
people carrying wires on their body.  The model used for 
this thesis expands on the original model by adding the 
comparison of an individual's speed calculated by radar and 
thermal temperatures calculated by infrared to determine if 
the combination of more than one sensor reading increases 
the probability of detecting a human wearing a suicide vest 
compared to a single technology.  The detailed algorithm 
for our model is seen in Figure 46. Of the five 
technologies incorporated in our proposed system, only 
radar and infrared have quantitative values that can be 
incorporated into a model.  X-ray, terahertz and millimeter 
wave technologies all produce images that are qualitative 
and require either an automated imaging comparison program 
or a man-in-the-loop to compare real-time images to 







INPUTS: N, number of runs, assumed distribution for the 
number of suicide bombers in a crowd, distributions for 
probability metric for radar detections, threshold value 
OUTPUTS: the number of positive detections, the number of 
false detections 
 
Step 1. Initialize all counters: detections = 0, false 
alarms=0, suicide bombers =0 
 
Step 2. For i = 1,2,…, N trials do 
 
Step 3. Generate a random number from an integer interval 
[a,b]. 
 
Step 4. Obtain an event of a suicide bomber based upon our 
hypothesized distribution of the number of suicide bombers 
in a crowd of size X. Basically if random number < a 
specified small value then we have a suicide bomber, 
otherwise we do not. 
For example, we might generate random numbers between 
[1,300] and if the random number is < 2 then they are a 
suicide bomber. 
 
Step 5. Generate a random number from the distribution of 
|VV-HH| differences depending on whether the target is a 
suicide bomber with a vest and wires or not a suicide 
bomber. These distributions are described previously in 
Table 2. 
 
Step 6. Compare results from step 5 to threshold value 
using the following: 
Target present: y(t) > YÆ correct detection 
Target present: y(t) < YÆ missed detection 
Target not present: y(t) > YÆ  false alarm 
Target not present:  y(t) < YÆ no action 
 
Step 7. Generate a random speed for each of the N trials 
above based upon  
Speed normal about 1 m/sec for a non-suicide bomber 
and 
     Speed is 1-.5(rand()) or 1=.5+rand() for a bomber on 
drugs 
 
Step 8. Compare for detection with speed. 
Target present: z(t) > ZÆ correct detection 
Target present: z(t) < ZÆ missed detection 
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Target not present: z(t) > ZÆ  false alarm 
Target not present:  z(t) < ZÆ no action 
 
Step 9. Generate a random number for thermal imaging for 
temperature difference based upon  




⋅ −  
Thermal difference for a normal person temperature percent 
differential of 




⋅ −  using temperatureh= 98.6 and 
temperturel = 95 
 
Thermal difference for a normal person temperature percent 
differential of 




⋅ −  using temperatureh= 98.6 and 
temperturel =  a random number between 70-95 degrees) 
Step 10. Compare for detection by thermal imagining 
 
 
Target present: w(t) > WÆ correct detection 
Target present: w(t) < WÆ missed detection 
Target not present: w(t) > WÆ  false alarm 
Target not present: w(t) < WÆ no action 
 
Step 11.  Increase all Counters as necessary 
 
Step 12. Output statistics under the assumption of 
independence 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P A B P A P B P A P B∪ = + − ⋅   for two events or 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P A B C P A P B P C P A P B P A P C P B P C P A P B P C∪ ∪ = + + − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  
END 
 
Figure 46.   Simulation for Methodology Model for RCS, 
Radar, and Thermal (After Fox et al., 2009).  
Prior to running the model, we established the 
threshold range (high-level and low-level) for an 
individual human's radar cross-section, speed, and thermal 
reading.  Since we did not conduct field tests, we used the 
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real data for radar cross sections collected by Fox et al. 
and made assumptions for speed values and thermal values 
based on our research.  For speed values we assumed that an 
average person walks at a rate of 1 m/s and that a variance 
from that could be a sign of abnormal behavior.  This 
assumption is based on research conducted by the 
Bornstein's in 1977, where they found that people in a 
region walk at about the same speed.  If a crowd is moving 
at a certain speed and a person in that crowd is walking at 
a speed that is significantly faster or slower than our 
specified threshold, then that person might be a suspect. 
The person's speed might vary as a result of drugs, or 
a result of carrying the excessive weight of an IED. The 
thermal temperature difference threshold is based on an 
average surface temperature for a human being approximately 
100 degrees Fahrenheit.  If the difference in temperature 
between an object in the torso area and the average surface 
temperature of the individual is between 3% to 7%, there 
might be an object under the clothing.  Again, we think the 
combination of these threshold values in the model should 
improve the statistics on detecting the target as well as 






Figure 47.    The Model controls showing the tool bars to 
vary the threshold values.  
C. DESCRIPTION OF MODEL 
The model runs through 1000 iterations 10 sequential 
times for each execution.  In each iteration, the model 
randomly generates a crowd size and values for radar cross-
section, speed, and thermal temperature for each individual 
in the crowd.  The randomly generated values created for 
each individual are compared to the preselected threshold 
values identified before each execution of the model.  The 
model compares the threshold values with the randomly 
generated values to determine if a bomber is present. 
Depending on the threshold values, the model can identify a 
true detection, false detection, or a miss.  The model only 
identifies if a bomber is or is not present in a crowd buy 
using a binary 0 or 1 to represent no or yes.  However, it 
does not identify how many bombers are in the crowd.  After 
each execution of the model, the  conditional probabilities 




Table 3.   Conditional probabilities calculated by model. 
There are three threshold values (RCS, Speed, and 
thermal) that can be adjusted with any combination of the 
three.  Once the threshold values were selected, we ran the 
model multiple times with the same threshold values, which 
allowed us to average the average probabilities and 
establish a normal distribution of the data. We classified 
the threshold values as low, medium, or high and changed 
them in various combinations to determine which threshold 
combination produces the highest probability of detection 
with the lowest probability of false detection.  
D. TESTING METHOD 
Following the methodology identified in Chapter III, 
we ran the model to test each threshold value 
independently, then as a combination of two thresholds, and 
finally with all three thresholds.  Although the only real 
data we had from previous research field testing was the 
radar data, we were still able to determine if there is an 
increase in the probability of detecting a bomber while 
reducing the probability of false positives.  
E. TESTING USING INDIVIDUAL THRESHOLD VALUES 
The probability of identifying a bomber in a crowd 
using only the RCS of an individual to determine if wires 
are present decreased as the threshold value increased. 
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This shows us that that the smaller the individual RCS 
ratio, the higher the probability of detecting an actual 
bomber.  As the probability of detecting an actual bomber 
goes up, so does the probability of a false detection. When 
using only RCS as a detection system, we found that a 
medium threshold value produced the highest probability of 
detection with the lowest probability of a false detection. 
The challenge for decision makers is to determine what is 
an acceptable ratio between the probability of detection 
and the probability of a false detection.  
 
 
Table 4.   Calculated probability of detecting a bomber and 
false detection for increasing RCS thresholds. 
After running the model to determine the optimal speed 
and thermal threshold values, we found that the resulting 
change in probability of detecting a bomber was not 
consistent with the change in threshold values.  As the 
threshold values were increased from low to high, the 
probability values for detecting a bomber were initially 
high with low threshold values. But, as the threshold 
values were adjusted within the medium range, those 
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probability values dropped, spiked, and dropped again. This 
spiking characteristic in the probability values shows us 
that within the medium threshold range, there is also an 
optimal threshold.  Overall, threshold values on the 
extreme low edge of the threshold range are the optimal 
values to produce the highest probability of detection for 
speed and thermal sensors run independently.  The 
probability of false detection for both the speed and 
thermal testing provided no valuable insight due to the 
assumption implemented in the model. With future research 
and field testing, real data can be implemented into the 
model, which will present a more accurate representation 
for the speed and thermal readings. 
 
 





Figure 49.   Single sensor probability using only speed. 
 
 
Figure 50.   Single sensor probability using only thermal 
temperature.  
F. TESTING USING TWO THRESHOLD VALUES 
As we progressed the testing through our methodology 
described in Chapter III, we ran the model with multiples 
of two threshold values to determine if the probability 
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increased as we added additional sensors.  The first test 
with the model was done with RCS and speed threshold 
values, then RCS and thermal values, and finally speed and 
thermal values. The testing of RCS with speed and RCS with 
thermal threshold values had similar resulting.  For both 
combinations of testing, the probabilities were 
inconsistent and fluctuated throughout the low, med, and 
high threshold values.  As the probability of detecting a 
bomber went up, so did the probability of a false 
detection.  Compared to an individual threshold being 
testing independently, the probability of a false detection 
dropped within these combinations.  The test consisting of 
speed and thermal threshold values combined showed that the 
probability of detecting a bomber increased throughout all 
threshold values.  However, as the threshold values 
increased from medium to high values, the probability of a 
false detection also increased. 
G. TESTING USING THREE THRESHOLD VALUES 
The final test with the model was performed with all 
three-threshold values combined and measured orthogonally. 
The resulting values were the most consistent of all the 
tests performed with the model.  We tried multiple 
combinations of threshold values while changing the 
individual threshold values from low, low, low to high, 
high, high to determine what combination of threshold 
values produced the highest probability of detection.  As 
we changed the individual sensor's threshold values, we 




fluctuated very little, while the probability of a false 
detection remained consistently around 10% for all 
combinations of threshold values. 
Since the model generates random values, we ran the 
model multiple times with the same values to calculate the 
average of the average probabilities.  This allowed us to 
establish a normal distribution of values and eliminate any 
outliers created from the random values.  After running the 
model, with varying combinations of threshold values and 
sensors, to follow our methodology, we found that the 
overall probability of detecting a bomber increased as the 
probability of a false detection decreased.  
 
 
Figure 51.   Multiple sensor probability using a varying 
RCS threshold and constant speed and thermal 
threshold. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
Suicide attacks will continue to pose a significant 
threat to the United States and its allies.  Organizations 
will continue to employ suicide bombers both as tactical 
and strategic weapons.  Preventing suicide attacks in the 
planning stages has proven to be an effective method from 
stopping attacks and should remain as the primary 
countermeasure.  Standoff detection sensors can be a useful 
tool in deterring attacks and indentifying suicide bombers 
at checkpoints and public areas.  There is no single sensor 
that can detect all types or characteristics of a suicide 
bomber or explosive vest.  Integrating multiple sensors and 
fusing the data into a single system is a continuing 
challenge but will be the most effective way to best detect 
suicide bombers at a standoff distance. 
It is extremely difficult to identify a suicide bomber 
without the use of sensors, especially since historically, 
nearly all suicide bombers concealed their explosive device 
prior to detonation. Therefore, the current baseline 
detection probability of visual identification is nearly 
zero.  Using the data from our model, we can conclude that 
compared to the current detection method of relying on 
visual identification of a suicide bomber, our methodology 
of incorporating multiple sensors with specific threshold 
values produces a higher probability of detecting a bomber.  
By running multiple tests through the model, we were able 
to determine that the combination of three sensors vice one 
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sensor produced a higher probability of detecting a bomber 
while reducing the probability of a false detection. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Research and experimentation must continue in order to 
develop sensors with increased sensitivity and specificity.  
Increasing both the sensitivity and specificity will lead 
to improved detection rates and fewer false alarms.  
Identifying common characteristics of a suicide bomber will 
continue to be a major challenge for image sensors, and as 
such, sensors must be able to find a minute signal within a 
dynamic environment full of white noise.  As image 
comparison technology continues to improve, further 
research must be conducted in the area of data fusion.  
Our proposed methodology uses both high and low 
threshold values, η and γ.  These threshold values were 
used in a simulation model to determine if there is a 
specific sequence or operation for the highest detection 
probabilities.  For the purpose of our research, the 
threshold values we used were taken from past research and 
experimentations conducted by other individuals.  We were 
able to adjust the threshold values in the model to 
determine the best probability of detection while reducing 
the probability of a false detection.  However, future 
research must be conducted in each technology field to 
determine the optimal threshold for each sensor.  As the 
fidelity and accuracy of the threshold values become more 
precise, the detection system will produce a higher 
detection probability while continuing to reduce false 
detections. 
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The detection ranges and standoff distances of the 
sensors will continue to be a challenge.  Many of the 
sensors have a maximum detection range around 10 meters, 
therefore, further research needs to be conducted to 
increase standoff detection distance.  As the detection 
ranges and standoff distances increase, the resolution and 
accuracy of the sensors must also increase.  
In order to determine the threshold values for image-
producing sensors, our proposed methodology assumed that 
imaging software was capable of comparing the image 
received from the sensor to images stored in databases at 
real-time speeds.  There needs be continued research in 
automated image-comparison software in order to increase 
the probability of detecting a bomber. 
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